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One of the oldest themes in international economics is that larger or more open economies are likely to be more
competitive. This notion has been formalized in a variety of ways. Partial-equilibrium models of oligopoly
have shown that trade liberalization or increases in market size generate a competition eﬀect which reduces
output and proﬁt margins of incumbent ﬁrms and may make it harder for them to sustain collusion in repeated
interactions.1 Krugman (1979) showed that competition eﬀects can also arise in a general-equilibrium model
with diﬀerentiated products, free entry and general additively-separable demands. However, most subsequent
studies of trade in general equilibrium have used the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition with
CES preferences, which implies that ﬁrms’ price-cost margins, and hence the degree of competition in the
economy, are independent of market size. Melitz (2003) introduces ﬁrm heterogeneity into such a framework,
and shows that trade liberalization favours more eﬃcient ﬁrms at the expense of less eﬃcient ones. However,
this is a selection eﬀect rather than a competition eﬀect, since in the Melitz model each individual ﬁrm
always has the same mark-up. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that this can be relaxed in a model
with a quadratic demand system similar to the one we use in this paper. However, since they assume that
preferences are quasi-linear, they do not model the impact on factor markets. Much remains to be done to
understand the implications of allowing ﬁrm mark-ups and the degree of competition to be endogenous in a
general-equilibrium model.
In this paper we provide a new explanation of how exogenous shocks such as growth or trade liberalization
can lead to changes in the degree of competitive behaviour throughout the economy. We do this by embedding
am o d e lo fﬁrm behaviour along the lines of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in a framework of general
oligopolistic equilibrium presented in Neary (2003a, 2007). In the model of Kreps and Scheinkman, as
simpliﬁed and reduced to an equilibrium in pure strategies by Maggi (1996), ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated
products ﬁr s ti n v e s ti nc a p a c i t ya n dt h e ns e t their output prices. Although ﬁr m sa l w a y sc o m p e t ei na
Bertrand manner in the second stage of the game, the outcome may or may not resemble that of a one-stage
Bertrand game. It will do so if the cost savings from prior investment in capacity are below a threshold
level.2 By contrast, if the cost savings exceed the threshold, then the outcome is “as if” the ﬁrms were
playing a one-stage Cournot game. Since it is well-known that, other things equal, Bertrand behaviour is
more competitive than Cournot (implying higher output and lower mark-ups), this model implies that the
nature of technology in a sector is an independent determinant of the extent of competition there.3
All previous applications of this approach have considered only a single sector in partial equilibrium.4
Moreover, they have assumed that the crucial threshold parameter is exogenous. By contrast, a major
contribution of our paper is to show that it is endogenous in general equilibrium. As in previous work,
the threshold parameter depends on a technological component, which varies across sectors. In addition,
it depends on a cost component, which is linked to economy-widef a c t o rp r i c e s . T h i si sb e c a u s ei n v e s t i n g
in capacity installation is assumed to require a diﬀerent factor mix from routine production. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that investment uses skilled workers while production uses unskilled. (Our results are quali-
tatively unchanged as long as capacity installation uses skilled labour more intensively than production.)
This assumption is supported by much of the empirical literature on technology, trade and wages, where
the distinction between production and non-production workers is assumed to coincide with that between
unskilled and skilled workers. See for example Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Hanson and Harrison
(1999), Feenstra (2003, p. 101) and Bernard et al. (2008). Its implications have also been explored in a
1Brander (1981) is an early example of the former; Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) and Fung (1992) illustrate the latter.
2Strictly speaking, in sectors below the threshold level in which the equilibrium level of investment in capacity is strictly
positive, the outcome is a “quasi-Bertrand” one, as we explain in Section 4.
3This underlies one of Maggi’s key results: the greater the cost savings from investing in capacity, the more the outcome
resembles that of a less competitive Cournot game, and hence the more likely an export subsidy is to be optimal.
4The Kreps-Scheinkman model has been further explored by Davidson and Deneckere (1986), Friedman (1988), Madden
(1998), and Boccard and Wauthy (2000), and has been applied to trade issues by Venables (1990) and Ben-Zvi and Helpman
(1992) as well as by Maggi.
2number of other theoretical studies.5
An immediate implication of this view of the technology of production is that shocks to an equilibrium,
such as trade liberalization, aﬀect factor prices and therefore alter the cost component of the threshold
parameter. As a result, such shocks change the mix of sectors between “more” and “less” competitive, or,
equivalently, between those exhibiting Bertrand and Cournot behaviour. The model thus suggests a new
mechanism whereby exogenous changes can aﬀect the degree of competition in an economy. It also throws
new light on the impact of trade liberalization and technological change on the relative wages of skilled and
unskilled workers.
To set the scene, we begin by considering the model in the absence of oligopolistic interaction. Section
2 examines the case of a closed economy where each of a continuum of sectors has only a single ﬁrm. We
show how the level of investment in capacity is chosen and in Section 3 illustrate the determination of
equilibrium. Section 4 extends this model to an integrated world economy with home and foreign ﬁrms
active in each sector, and explains how the mix between “Bertrand” and “Cournot” sectors is determined.
Section 5 considers the eﬀects of shocks to the initial equilibrium. Finally, Section 6 compares the autarky
and free-trade equilibria, and shows how opening up such a world to trade aﬀects the degree of competition
and the distribution of income, even though the two countries in our “North-North” model are identical.
2 Autarky with Monopoly in General Equilibrium
2.1 Technology
We consider an economy with a continuum of sectors indexed by z, which varies along the unit interval:
z ∈ [0,1]. Until Section 4 we focus on the autarky equilibrium, in which there is a single ﬁrm in each
sector. Each ﬁrm takes two decisions: how much to invest in capacity, and how much output to produce. We
follow Maggi (1996) in assuming that capacity is not a rigid constraint on output: ﬁrms can produce beyond
capacity though they incur higher marginal costs when they do so. In addition, we extend Maggi’s framework
to allow for the possibility that ﬁrms may not invest in capacity at all, choosing instead to incur the penalty
of producing above capacity on all units they produce. We consider how a ﬁrm chooses its optimal capacity
in the next sub-section. In the remainder of this one, we explain our second main departure from Maggi:
the links between technology and factor demands which allow us to embed the model in general equilibrium.
As already discussed, production and capacity installation require diﬀerent factors of production, un-
skilled and skilled labour respectively. Factor markets are economy-wide, so all sectors face the same factor
prices: w for unskilled labour and r for skilled labour. The skilled labour requirement for a unit of capacity
is the same across all sectors, equal to δ.6 By contrast, sectors diﬀer in their technologies for production. For
all units up to capacity the unskilled labour requirement in sector z is γ(z); while each unit of production
above capacity requires θ(z) additional unskilled workers. Hence, letting q(z)a n dk(z) denote the levels of
output and capacity in sector z, respectively, total costs can be written as:
C (z)=rδk(z)+
½
wγ(z)q (z)i f q (z) ≤ k(z)
wγ(z)q (z)+wθ(z)[q (z) − k(z)] if q (z) >k(z) (1)
5This assumption of non-homotheticity in production has been made in some models of trade under monopolistic competition.
Lawrence and Spiller (1983) distinguish between physical capital and labour (rather than skilled and unskilled labour) and
assume that they are exclusively used in ﬁxed and variable costs respectively. Flam and Helpman (1987) allow for diﬀerences in
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour between ﬁxed costs (which they interpret as R&D costs incurred in product development)
and variable costs. Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) show that the core-periphery new economic geography model can be solved
analytically when the geographically mobile factor is used exclusively in ﬁxed costs and the immobile factor in variable costs.
6Assuming that δ is common across sectors can be rationalized in terms of a competitive sector supplying capacity-installation
services, as in Mussa (1978), though without costs of adjustment. Relaxing this assumption complicates the model considerably
without yielding additional insight.
3Without loss of generality, we order the sectors such that θ(z)r i s e s( o ra tl e a s td o e sn o tf a l l )w i t hz. Thus:
θ
0(z) ≥ 0( 2 )
In addition, we will sometimes assume that γ(z)f a l l s( o ra tl e a s td o e sn o tr i s e )w i t hz;t h i si sn o te s s e n t i a l
for our results, though it helps with the interpretation of the model. In diagrams and simulations it is
convenient to specialize to the case where both γ(z)a n dθ(z) are linear in z: γ (z)=γ0 − γ1z,w h e r eγ0 ≥
γ1 ≥ 0; and θ(z)=θ0 + θ1z,w h e r eθ0 ≥ 0a n dθ1 ≥ 0.7
To interpret these assumptions about factor requirements, note from (1) that ﬁrms in eﬀect have a choice
between two technologies: an unskilled-labour-intensive technology for units produced above capacity, and a
skilled-labour-intensive technology for units produced at or below capacity. The parameter θ(z)m e a s u r e st h e
penalty which a ﬁrm in sector z incurs for saving on skilled labour by producing above capacity. Maggi (1996)
interprets this as either a cost of outsourcing or a premium that must be paid to unionized workers to induce
them to work overtime. More generally, we can view it as a measure of the ﬁrm’s cost of producing with
the unskilled-labour-intensive technology. This means that low-z sectors have less incentive to hire skilled
w o r k e r s . H e n c ew ed e ﬁne sectors with low values of z as relatively unskilled-labour-intensive. Conversely,
sectors with high values of z have the opposite conﬁguration and so are relatively skilled-labour-intensive.
Note that this deﬁnition coincides with one that focuses on a sector’s unskilled labour requirements γ(z)i n
t h ec a s ew h e r eγ (z) is strictly decreasing in z. We can also interpret diﬀerences between sectors in terms of
labour productivity. For sectors which do invest in capacity, unskilled labour productivity is just γ (z)
−1,s o
if γ (z)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nz then unskilled labour is more productive in less unskilled-labour-intensive sectors.
Similar assumptions have been made in other recent papers. For example, Costinot and Vogel (2010) assume
that high-skill workers have a comparative advantage in sectors with high skill intensities; while Harrigan and
Reshef (2010) assume that there is a positive correlation between ﬁrms’ skill intensity and their productivity.8
2.2 Capacity Choice
When will a ﬁrm invest in capacity? Consider the marginal costs which it incurs depending on its choice of
capacity and output.9 In the absence of uncertainty and with no threat of entry, a ﬁrm will never choose to
hold excess capacity, since it incurs a cost of rδ per unit on the excess capacity, but has no resulting output
available for sale. If it produces above capacity (whether its capacity is positive or zero), its marginal cost
is cN (z); while if it invests and produces at capacity, its marginal cost (including the cost of capacity itself)
is cK (z); where the marginal costs are deﬁned as follows:
(i) cN (z) ≡ w{γ(z)+θ(z)} (ii) cK (z) ≡ wγ(z)+rδ (3)
The marginal cost cN (z) consists of the core cost of hiring unskilled workers, wγ (z), plus the additional
cost of producing above capacity, wθ(z). By contrast, the marginal cost cK (z) consists of the core cost of
unskilled workers, wγ (z), plus the cost of a unit of capacity, rδ, equal to the skilled wage times the number
of skilled workers needed to produce the unit.
7When both γ0 and θ0 are zero (corresponding to γ1 = θ1 = 0 when the functions are linear), all sectors are identical. This
very special case is called the “featureless economy” inN e a r y( 2 0 0 3 b )a n dw i l ln o tb ec o n s i d e r e df u r t h e r .
8T h es a m en e e dn o tb et r u ef o rs e c t o r sw h i c hd onot invest in capacity and so do not use skilled labour, however. Employment
of unskilled workers in such sectors equals [γ (z)+θ (z)]q (z), so unskilled labour productivity equals [γ (z)+θ (z)]−1. Hence,
unskilled labour can be either more or less productive in less unskilled-labour-intensive sectors depending on whether γ (z)+θ(z)
is increasing or decreasing in z, in other words, depending on whether or not the increase in θ as z r i s e si ss u ﬃcient to oﬀset
the decrease in γ.
9In the case where the ﬁrm invests in capacity, Maggi distinguishes between short-run and long-run marginal cost. In our
notation, short-run marginal cost equals wγ (z)w h e nq (z) ≤ k(z), and w{γ (z)+θ (z)} when q (z) >k (z); while long-run
marginal cost equals wγ (z)+rδ. However, when the ﬁrm does not invest in capacity, the distinction between short-run and
long-run marginal cost is moot. Moreover, in the present case of a single monopoly ﬁrm, decisions on capacity and output are
in eﬀect contemporaneous, so there is no distinction between short- and long-run in either the time or stage dimension.
4The monopoly ﬁrm’s decision is now very simple:10 if cN (z)i sl e s st h a ncK (z), then the ﬁrm will choose
not to invest in capacity; while if cN (z) is greater than cK (z), then it will invest in capacity.11 As already
noted, it will never choose to produce below capacity. Nor when cN (z) >c K (z) will it produce above
capacity, since it could produce the same output at lower cost by investing more in capacity. Hence the
capacity investment choice the ﬁrm faces is all-or-nothing, and depends on the relative magnitude of cN (z)
and cK (z).
Comparing the two marginal costs, cN (z)a n dcK (z) ,t h ed e c i s i o nt oi n v e s ti na ne x t r au n i to fc a p a c i t y
reﬂects a trade-oﬀ between the additional cost rδ and the beneﬁto fs a v i n gwθ(z) on the unit of output
produced. Hence the marginal sector which is indiﬀerent between investing in capacity and not is the one
for which cN (z)a n dcK (z) are equal; i.e., it is the sector indexed by ˜ z, the solution to the equation:
rδ = wθ(˜ z)( 4 )
Provided we assume that θ(z) is strictly increasing in z, this equation must have a unique solution. However,
the value of ˜ z need not lie strictly between zero and one. If it does, then some sectors (those for which z>˜ z)
invest in capacity while others (those for which z ≤ ˜ z) do not. If, instead, the value of ˜ z which satisﬁes (4)
lies outside these admissible bounds, then the eﬀective value of ˜ z must take on one or other boundary value.
At one extreme, if the relative cost of skilled labour is so high or extra capacity is so unproductive that rδ
exceeds wθ(z) for all z ∈ [0,1), then no sectors invest in capacity and ˜ z equals one. At the other extreme, if
capacity is relatively cheap so rδ is less than wθ(z) for all z ∈ (0,1], then all sectors invest in capacity and
˜ z equals zero. In most of the paper we concentrate on the case where ˜ z lies strictly between zero and one,
since this gives the richest set of outcomes. Other cases will be mentioned in passing.
Note the comparative statics implications of (4). Both an increase in the skill premium r/w and a fall
in the productivity of skilled workers (i.e., a rise in δ) are associated with a rise in ˜ z.E a c ho ft h e s es h o c k s
makes investing in capacity less attractive, and so fewer sectors choose to do so in equilibrium. In this case
we can say that the extensive margin of capacity investment rises.
2.3 Preferences
Consumer preferences take a continuum quadratic form as in Neary (2003a), extended to allow for diﬀeren-
tiated products within sectors. There are ¯ L identical households, each with additively separable preferences





where the sub-utility functions are quadratic. Note that there is no num´ eraire or outside good: preferences
are not quasi-linear, so the demands for all goods are aﬀected by changes in income. In the monopoly case,
we do not need to distinguish between diﬀerent varieties, and so u{x(z)} is simply ax(z) − b
2x(z)2,w i t h
a>0a n db>0. In Sections 4 and 5 we allow for duopoly, so the sub-utility functions become:12




x1(z)2 + x2(z)2 +2 ex1(z)x2(z)
¤
(6)
Here xi (z) is the individual’s demand for variety i in sector z;a n de, which is positive and strictly less than
one (0 ≤ e<1), is an inverse measure of product diﬀerentiation, ranging from zero (the case of unrelated
10We will see in Section 4 that the same conclusions follow in the duopoly case, though the argument is more subtle.
11Maggi considered only the latter case, where cN (z) <c K (z) .I nt h ek n i f e - e d g ec a s ew h e r et h et w om a r g i n a lc o s t sc o i n c i d e ,
so cN (z)=cK (z), we assume that the ﬁrm does not invest in capacity.
12Our treatment of diﬀerentiated product demand within each sector follows Dixit (1981) and Vives (1985).
5goods) to one (the case of identical products). With varieties x1 (z)a n dx2 (z)p r o d u c e db yr i v a lﬁrms in
duopoly, e will also serve as a measure of the intensity of competition within sectors.
Each household maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint:
Z 1
0
[p1(z)x1 (z)+p2(z)x2 (z)]dz ≤ I (7)







[xi(z)+exj(z)] i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j (8)














2 denote respectively the ﬁrst and second moments of the distribution of prices and νp denotes
the (uncentred) covariance of prices across sectors. (Details are given in the Appendix.) Aggregating over
all ¯ L households and imposing market clearing (so the total quantity sold by ﬁrm i in sector z, qi(z), equals
¯ Lxi(z), for all i,z) yields the market inverse demand functions:
pi(z)=ˆ a −ˆ b[qi(z)+eqj(z)] i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j (10)
where ˆ a ≡ a/λ and ˆ b ≡ b/λ¯ L. Because of λ, the demand functions are highly non-linear in prices. However,
λ depends only on economy-wide variables and not directly on variables in sector z. Hence, ﬁrms in sector
z take ˆ a and ˆ b as given in their decision-making, so from the perspective of individual sectors the demand
functions are linear.
2.4 Factor markets
We assume that each of the ¯ L households supplies one unit of unskilled labour and s units of skilled labour,
and that wage ﬂexibility brings about full employment of both factors. Equilibrium in the market for unskilled
workers therefore requires that total supply ¯ L must equal the aggregate demand for unskilled labour, which





[γ (z)+θ(z)]qA[cN (z)]dz +
Z 1
˜ z
γ (z)qA[cK (z)]dz (11)
The equilibrium level of output in autarky qA is the outcome of proﬁt-maximization by each ﬁrm in the face
of the demand function (10). Routine calculations show that it equals:
qA(c)=
ˆ a − c
2ˆ b
(12)
where the marginal cost c equals cN (z) in sectors that do not invest in capacity and cK (z)i nt h o s et h a td o .
Note that the unskilled labour requirement in (11) drops discontinuously at ˜ z, the threshold sector where
ﬁrms switch to investing in capacity, allowing them to save on θ(z) workers per unit output.





The endowment of skilled workers is s times the endowment of unskilled workers, while the demand for
skilled workers comes only from sectors that invest in capacity, in each of which it equals δ times its output
qA.
2.5 National Income
To complete the model we need to specify how proﬁts are disbursed. It is convenient to assume that they
are redistributed costlessly in equal shares to each of the ¯ L households. National income therefore equals
the sum of factor payments and proﬁts, so national income per household, denoted by I,i s :
I = w + rs+ Π/¯ L (14)
where Π is the sum of proﬁts of all ﬁrms in the economy.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
The full model consists of the two labour-market equilibrium conditions, (11) and (13), with the level of
output in each sector given by (12); the equation for the threshold sector or extensive margin ˜ z,( 4 ) ;a n d
the deﬁnitions of income and the marginal utility of income, (14) and (9). However, we have one degree of
freedom in solving for nominal variables: as in Neary (2003a), all real variables are homogeneous of degree
zero in the nominal variables w, r and λ
−1. Hence we can choose an arbitrary num´ eraire without aﬀecting
the model’s properties, and it is convenient to choose the marginal utility of income itself as num´ eraire,
setting λ equal to one.
The model can be further simpliﬁed by using (4) to eliminate the skilled wage r. This reduces the model
to two equations in w and ˜ z, which can be illustrated in a single diagram as in Fig. 1.13 The properties of
these equations are derived formally in the Appendix, Section 8.2. Here we give an intuitive account.
Consider ﬁrst the equilibrium condition in the market for skilled labour. This is given by equation (13)
with monopoly output given by (12) and marginal cost cK (z) by (3). The demand for skilled labour is
decreasing in the unskilled wage w for two distinct reasons. On the one hand, a rise in w raises costs directly,
since skilled and unskilled labour are technical complements in production in each sector that invests in
capacity.14 On the other hand, a rise in w also raises costs indirectly, since from (4) it raises the skilled
wage r needed to maintain the initial value of the threshold sector ˜ z. The demand for skilled labour is
also decreasing in ˜ z itself for similar reasons. On the one hand, an increase in ˜ z reduces the demand for
skilled labour at the extensive margin, as the marginal sector ceases to invest in capacity. On the other
hand, an increase in ˜ z raises the equilibrium skilled wage r at a given unskilled wage w, so inducing all
capacity-using sectors (those for which z>˜ z) to invest in less capacity at the intensive margin. The locus
13It might seem that it would be simpler to eliminate ˜ z rather than r. However, the slopes of the loci in the ﬁgures are not
so clear-cut in that case. Where this approach becomes very useful is in the boundary case where all sectors invest in capacity
so ˜ z is zero. The model then reduces to two excess factor demand equations which exhibit gross substitutability: L = LD(w,r)
and S = SD(w,r). The comparative statics properties of this system are easily derived, and (provided ˜ z remains equal to zero)
they are very similar to those of the more complex case considered in the text.
14The technology could be described as “putty-clay”. (See Solow (1962) and Bliss (1968).) There is a discrete choice between
two techniques ex ante, while after capacity is installed the skilled-to-unskilled labour ratio equals δ/γ (z). Even the latter is
not ﬁx e di nt h ee n g i n e e r i n gs e n s e ,s i n c eﬁrms could in principle produce above or below capacity. However, in equilibrium it is
never proﬁt-maximising to do so.
7is thus downward-sloping, as shown in Fig. 1, with points above corresponding to states of excess supply of
skilled labour.
Consider next the equilibrium condition in the market for unskilled labour, equation (11). A rise in
the unskilled wage induces all sectors to reduce their labour demand at the intensive margin, both directly
and indirectly (by raising the skilled wage). So, not surprisingly, unskilled labour demand is decreasing
in the unskilled wage. However, the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n˜ z on unskilled labour demand is ambiguous.
Let LA(w,r,e z) denote the total demand for unskilled labour, given by the left-hand side of (11). Totally


















γ (z)dz ≷ 0 (15)
The ﬁrst term, the direct or extensive-margin eﬀect, is positive: as e z increases, the marginal sector ceases
to invest in capacity, increasing its demand for unskilled labour by θ(˜ z) times its output qA. However, the
second term, the indirect or intensive-margin eﬀect, is negative: the increase in ˜ z requires an increase in the
skilled wage r f r o m( 4 ) ,w h i c hi nt u r nr a i s e scK, the cost of production for ﬁrms that have invested in capital,




∂c = − 1
2ˆ b < 0 from (12).) When ˜ z is close to one (strictly, inﬁnitesimally close), the second
eﬀect vanishes and so the ﬁrst, intensive-margin, eﬀect dominates and the locus must be upward-sloping.
We can characterize this as the case where skilled and unskilled labour are general-equilibrium complements,
since their prices move in the same direction along the locus: the skilled wage r rises because of the increase
in ˜ z; while, as fewer sectors invest in capacity, the demand for unskilled labour increases, so its wage w
also rises.15 Hence the locus is upward-sloping in the neighborhood of ˜ z = 1. However, for lower values of
˜ z, the second, intensive-margin, eﬀect may (though it need not) dominate. If that happens, then unskilled
labour is a general-equilibrium substitute for skilled labour: as fewer sectors invest in capacity, the demand
for unskilled labour falls in those sectors which continue to invest, causing the locus to be downward-sloping.
In general, we cannot resolve this ambiguity concerning the slope of the unskilled-labour-market equi-
librium locus. Even in the special case of linear labour requirement functions, we cannot pin down the
shape of the locus, though in extensive simulations it was always found to be U-shaped as illustrated in Fig.
1.16 Nor is it possible to rule out multiple equilibria. However, while the global behaviour of the model is
therefore ambiguous, we can pin down its local properties by invoking plausible stability conditions, which
imply that the out-of-equilibrium dynamics must be as shown by the arrows.17 Hence the local conﬁguration
in the neighborhood of a stable interior equilibrium must have the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus
SA cut the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus LA from above, as shown by point A0. Whether the
equilibrium point is on the downward-sloping or the upward-sloping portion of the unskilled-labour-market
equilibrium locus will turn out to be important for comparative statics in Section 5.
A ﬁnal consideration is that we have so far considered only interior equilibria. It is also possible that
the two loci may not intersect at all for values of ˜ z in the [0,1] interval. This corresponds to an economy
in which either all sectors invest in capacity, so ˜ z equals zero, or no sectors invest in capacity, so ˜ z equals
15Note that this is only one possible deﬁnition of complementarity or substitutability between factors. As we have already
seen, skilled and unskilled labour are always technical complements in partial equilibrium in those sectors which invest in
capacity. We have also seen that the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus always slopes downwards: as fewer sectors invest
in capacity, the unskilled wage must fall if the skilled-labour market is to remain in equilibrium.
16Details of the linear case are given in a supplementary appendix to the paper, available on request and at
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Members/peter.neary/papers/maggimix.htm.
17At points above the unskilled labour-market equilibrium locus, there is excess supply of unskilled labour, which we assume
tends to reduce the unskilled wage; conversely for points below. As for the skilled labour-market equilibrium locus, at points
to the right of it there is excess supply of skilled workers, as we have seen. We assume, as is natural, that this puts downward
pressure on the skilled wage, which, at a given unskilled wage, encourages more sectors to invest in capacity and so reduces the
extensive margin ˜ z. The converse applies for points to the left of the skilled labour-market equilibrium locus.
8one. The latter case cannot be an equilibrium, since the demand for skilled labour would fall to zero.18 The
former is the case where skilled labour is extremely abundant, and as noted in footnote 13 its properties are
less interesting and are easily derived. In most of the remainder of the text we concentrate on the case of a
stable interior equilibrium, as shown in Fig. 1.
4 Free Trade
4.1 Firm Behaviour in Duopoly
We turn next to consider the case of free trade between two identical economies, each with the same structure
as the economy of previous sections.19 This symmetric framework allows us to focus on a “North-North”
world where trade takes place because of oligopolistic interaction and product diﬀerentiation rather than
because of comparative advantage. We begin in this sub-section by considering the duopoly equilibrium
in each sector, where a single home ﬁrm competes against a single foreign one. We assume that the ﬁrms
engage in a two-stage game, ﬁrst choosing their levels of capacity and then, having observed each other’s
choices of capacity, choosing their prices, and meeting consumer demands at those prices.20
There are two cases to consider, corresponding to whether the marginal cost of investing in capacity, rδ,
is greater or less than the marginal beneﬁt, wθ(z). Consider ﬁrst the case where the cost is greater, i.e.,
from (4), consider those sectors where z<˜ z. There is clearly a candidate equilibrium which is symmetric,
and in which neither ﬁrm invests in capacity, engaging instead in a one-shot Bertrand game. Furthermore,
it is straightforward to show that this is indeed an equilibrium and that it is unique, since neither ﬁrm
has an incentive to deviate from it by investing in capacity.21 Hence, just as in the monopoly case already
considered, ﬁrms do not invest in capacity in sectors with z<˜ z. We call these ”Pure Bertrand” sectors.
Firms incur the unit cost cN (z) and charge the Bertrand equilibrium price, which we denote pB[cN (z)]: see
the ﬁrst entry in Table 1.
18As ˜ z approaches one, the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus is upward-sloping, as we have seen. Hence the value
of w on this locus at ˜ z = 1 must be positive. However, the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus asymptotes to a value for
w of minus inﬁnity, as the sectors which demand skilled workers disappear. Hence if s is strictly positive there cannot be an
equilibrium at ˜ z =1 .
19With minor modiﬁcations to the demand and factor-market-equilibrium conditions below, the model can be reinterpreted as
applying to a single economy in autarky, with two active ﬁrms in each sector. This yields a closed-economy general-equilibrium
extension of Kreps and Scheinkman.
20Following Maggi, we assume that ﬁrms never ﬁnd it proﬁtable to ration consumers. Strictly speaking, there are some feasible
oﬀ-equilibrium prices which would imply losses for ﬁr m si ft h e ym e ta l ld e m a n d ,s ot h e yw o u l dw i s ht or a t i o nc o n s u m e r s .( s e e
Boccard and Wauthy (2000).) However, if the cost function had a continuous ﬁrst derivative but was arbitrarily close to the
step function assumed here (which has a ﬁnite jump where output equals capacity), the results would be the same and ﬁrms
would never have recourse to rationing. The need to pay attention to rationing is therefore a knife-edge feature of the model,
which justiﬁes ignoring it in applications, especially to general equilibrium.
21In the symmetric case with no investment in capacity, each ﬁrm has marginal cost equal to cN,s ow ec a nw r i t et h e i rp r i c e
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that the ﬁrst ﬁrm deviates from this by investing in a level of capacity k w h i c hi sl e s st h a no re q u a lt ot h eo u t p u ti tp l a n s
to sell. As in Maggi (1996), the second-stage proﬁt-maximising price for the ﬁrst ﬁrm is still the price which would obtain in
















. Rearranging terms, we see that ΠKN = ΠNN−
¡
cK − cN¢
k. Hence investment in capacity
is not proﬁtable for cK >c N,i . e . ,f o rz<˜ z.
9Sector Price Price-Cost Margin Lerner Index
“Pure” Bertrand: 0 ≤ z ≤ ˜ zp B[cN (z)] pB[cN (z)] − cN (z)1 −
(2−e)cN
(1−e)ˆ a+cN
Quasi-Bertrand: ˜ z ≤ z ≤ zC pB[cN (z)] pB[cN (z)] − cK (z)1 −
(2−e)cK
(1−e)ˆ a+cN
Cournot: zC ≤ z ≤ 1 pC[cK (z)] pC[cK (z)] − cK (z)1 − ec
K
ˆ a+(1+e)cK
Table 1: Prices, Price-Cost Margins, and the Lerner Index Across Sectors
Turning next to the case where the marginal cost of investing in capacity is less than the marginal
beneﬁt, rδ <w θ(z), so z>˜ z, we can draw on the results of Maggi (1996). Note ﬁrst that, just as in the
monopoly case of Section 2, ﬁrms will never choose to hold excess capacity in equilibrium; and, provided
it is proﬁtable to invest in capacity (i.e., provided z>˜ z), they will never produce less than their installed
capacity. Hence the equilibrium level of investment is k(z)=q (z)w h e nz>˜ z.H o ww i l lﬁrms set prices
when z>˜ z? Investment in capacity lowers the cost of producing the marginal unit of output. In addition,
because capacity choices are observable before decisions on prices are taken, investing in capacity serves as
a commitment device, committing the ﬁrm to incurring a penalty if production exceeds capacity. Hence
investment in capacity sustains a higher price than the one-stage Bertrand equilibrium price. How much
higher depends, as Maggi shows, on the value of θ(z), yielding two-sub-cases, which we call “quasi-Bertrand”
and “Cournot” respectively. Firms which invest in capacity but have relatively low values of θ(z)c h o o s ea
price equal to the equilibrium price which would be set in a one-stage Bertrand game with unit costs equal
to cN(z), which in our general-equilibrium setting equals w{γ(z)+θ(z)}. We call these “quasi-Bertrand”
sectors, since this unit cost is higher than the true unit cost the ﬁrms actually incur, which equals cK (z)
or wγ(z)+rδ. (Firms in these sectors pay the unit cost of investing in capacity rδ but do not incur the
surcharge of θ(z) for producing above it).22 Thus the commitment to higher prices is relatively stronger
the greater the cost penalty θ(z). However, the price cannot be indeﬁnitely higher than the Bertrand price
corresponding to the costs actually incurred cK (z). The highest price which investment can sustain is the
price that would obtain in a one-stage Cournot equilibrium with unit costs equal to cK (z). Hence, ﬁrms in
sectors with suﬃciently high values of θ(z) can credibly commit to charging this price.
Summarizing these arguments, there is a threshold sector, denoted by zC, such that sectors with z ≤ zC
exhibit ”quasi-Bertrand” behaviour and sectors with z ≥ zC exhibit ”Cournot” behaviour, yielding the
equilibrium prices shown in the second column of Table 1. Using the linear inverse demand functions in (10)
these prices can be shown to equal:
pB(c)=
(1 − e)ˆ a + c
2 − e
and pC(c)=
ˆ a +( 1+e)c
2+e
(16)
for an arbitrary marginal cost c. The appropriate cost, cN or cK, is given in equation (3). As for the







22This result is analogous to the outcome of a one-stage Bertrand game with homogeneous products and heterogeneous costs.
In our model both ﬁrms incur a marginal cost of wγ(z)+rδ but they charge prices which reﬂect the marginal cost they would
incur if they deviated from the low-output equilibrium, w{γ(z)+θ(z)}. Similarly, in the one-stage Bertrand game, all ﬁrms
produce zero output except the lowest-cost ﬁrm. It charges a price equal, not to its own marginal cost, but to the marginal
cost of the second-lowest-cost ﬁrm, since that is the price which would prevail if the lowest-cost ﬁrm deviated and produced
less than equilibrium output.
10It is intuitively obvious that the threshold zC,d e ﬁned by (17), at which sectors that invest in capacity switch
to behaving “as if” a one-stage Cournot game was being played, must exceed the threshold e z,d e ﬁned by (4),
at which it becomes proﬁtable to invest in capacity. For completeness we state this formally:
Lemma 1 The threshold sector zC between “quasi-Bertrand” and Cournot sectors, deﬁned by (17), must
exceed e z.
(The proofs of this and subsequent results are in the Appendix.)
Consider next the comparative statics properties of the threshold sector zC. They can be found by totally
diﬀerentiating equation (17), and using the deﬁnitions of cN and cK from equation (3). The properties we
seek turn out to hinge on the sign of the expression H(z) ≡ θ
0(z)+[ e2/(2 + e)]γ0(z), evaluated at zC:
Lemma 2 The threshold Cournot sector zC is decreasing in the return to unskilled workers w and increasing




A plausible suﬃcient condition to ensure that H
¡
zC¢
is positive is that unskilled labour productivity in the
absence of investment in capacity is lower in more skill-intensive sectors: recalling the discussion in Section
2.1, this is equivalent to θ(z)+γ (z)i n c r e a s i n gi nz,o rθ
0 (z)+γ0 (z) > 0. This suﬃcient condition is implied
by the assumption of log-supermodularity of the worker productivity function made by Costinot and Vogel
(2010): more skilled workers have a comparative advantage in more skill-intensive tasks or sectors. More
generally, recall that, from (2), θ
0(z) is non-negative; moreover, the coeﬃcient of γ0(z)i nH (z) lies between
zero (when e = 0) and one third (when e = 1). Hence the condition H
¡
zC¢
> 0 would fail only if γ0 (z)i s
negative, so γ (z), the marginal cost when producing at or below capacity, falls in z, and by considerably
more than θ(z), the cost premium for producing above capacity, increases in z. This in turn would imply
that unskilled labour productivity in the absence of investment in capacity increased rapidly as we move
across sectors from less to more skill-intensive. It seems plausible to rule out this case, so henceforward we
assume that the condition in Lemma 2 holds at z = zC.
An immediate corollary of this result follows from the fact that, recalling (4), the return to skilled workers
r is increasing in both w and e z. Hence:
Corollary 1 When r is determined endogenously in general equilibrium, the threshold Cournot sector zC is








is positive also ensures that both move in the same direction in response to exogenous shocks.
Fig. 2 summarizes the implications of this discussion, illustrating how equilibrium prices vary across
sectors for given factor prices and threshold sectors. Here and subsequently (except where otherwise speciﬁed)
we assume that the equilibrium is an interior one, so both e z and zC lie between zero and one.23 In the “pure
Bertrand” sectors with z below e z, ﬁrms do not invest in capacity, and the equilibrium price is that in a
standard one-stage game with marginal costs equal to cN (z)=w{γ (z)+θ(z)}. The expression for the
equilibrium price is the same in the “quasi-Bertrand” sectors with z between e z and zC, but now this price
is above the pure Bertrand level, since the full marginal cost in this range is cK (z)=wγ (z)+δr,w h i c h
is less than cN (z). Finally, the “Cournot” sectors with z above zC have the highest sustainable price, the
Cournot price corresponding to the marginal cost cK (z).
Fig. 2 also illustrates the price-cost margins in each sector. Explicit expressions for these and for the
corresponding Lerner indices of market power (deﬁned as Λ ≡ (p − c)/p) are given in the third and fourth
columns of Table 1. In the “pure Bertrand” sectors, costs rise with z as θ(z)i si n c r e a s i n gi nz,a n dp a r to f
23To avoid distracting non-linearities, Figs. 2 and 3 use the special linear functional forms for the technology distributions
speciﬁed in Section 2.1, with the added simpliﬁcation that γ1 is zero, so γ (z) is independent of z.
11this rise is passed on to consumers, causing margins to fall slightly with z. However, beyond the threshold
sector e z, continuing rises in θ(z) allow ﬁrms to sustain higher prices and margins increase steadily until the
Cournot threshold zC.B e y o n dzC, further changes in price and margins occur only if γ (z) changes (which,
to simplify the ﬁgure, it does not in this case). Crucially, in these Cournot sectors, the Lerner index is
greater than it would be without investment in capacity, even though costs are lower as a result:
ΛC − ΛB =
¡








[ˆ a +( 1+e)cK][(1− e)ˆ a + cN]
(18)
Thus all sectors with cN ≥ cK, i.e., with z ≥ ˜ z, are less competitive under Cournot behaviour than they
would be under Bertrand behaviour. The same also holds for the comparison between the “quasi-Bertrand”
and “pure-Bertrand” sectors. Summarizing:
Lemma 3 Competition is reduced, in the sense that the Lerner Index of market power is higher, as a result
of ﬁrms being able to sustain higher prices, in all sectors above the ˜ z threshold.
The fact that Cournot is less competitive than Bertrand, other things equal, is familiar from Vives (1985).
However, this is usually interpreted as a discrete comparison between two alternative models. Here, it arises
as a result of an endogenous behavioral response in the same model. Moreover, there is a gradual transition
from pure Bertrand to Cournot behaviour between the two thresholds ˜ z and zC, as Fig. 2 illustrates. All of
this justiﬁes our viewing a rise in the value of ˜ z as an increase in the degree of competition in the economy:
such a change in the extensive margin implies that fewer sectors exhibit quasi-Bertrand or Cournot behaviour,
with higher price-cost margins than otherwise.
4.2 Intersectoral Diﬀerences in Factor Demands
We are now ready to consider the full general equilibrium of the integrated world economy with duopoly
in each sector. Because of symmetry between countries, we need consider equilibrium in one country only.
The full employment conditions are similar to those in the autarky case, equations (11) and (13), with two
added complications. First, factor demands diﬀer between the “quasi-Bertrand” sectors (with e z<z<z C)
and the “Cournot” sectors (with z>z C); and, second, factor demands from all sectors are higher than in
autarky because the goods market has doubled in size. It is true that ﬁrms now face competition, but this
is more than oﬀset by the increase in market size. Routine calculations show that outputs in Bertrand and
Cournot competition equal:
qB(c)=
ˆ a − c
ˆ b(1 + e)(2 − e)
and qC(c)=
ˆ a − c
ˆ b(2 + e)
(19)
Because there are now two ﬁrms in each sector rather than one, these would be smaller than autarky output
as given by (12) if the market size were unchanged. But the opening up of the foreign market means that the
demand parameter ˆ b, an inverse measure of market size, now equals b/2λ¯ L instead of b/λ¯ L in the autarky
case. It is easily checked that this market size eﬀect dominates, so qB(c) ≥ qC(c) >q A(c) (with the ﬁrst
equality strict except when e is zero).
Given these equilibrium outputs, their implications for the derived demand for skilled labour are sum-
















). Similarly, the equilibrium condition in the










γ (z)qB[cN (z)]dz +
Z 1
zC
γ (z)qC[cK (z)]dz (21)
Note that the demand for unskilled labour per unit output falls discretely from γ (z)+θ(z)t oγ (z)a tz = e z
as in the autarky case given by (11); while the level of output is continuous in z,b o t ha tz = e z and at z = zC
where it switches from the Bertrand equilibrium output qB(c) to the Cournot output qC(c).
These aggregate factor demands are most easily understood by considering how they vary across sectors,
as illustrated in Fig. 3, where s(z)a n dl(z) denote the skilled and unskilled labour demand in sector z
respectively. Sectors with z below ˜ z do not invest in capacity and so demand unskilled labour only. Their
demand for unskilled labour may either rise or fall with z: Fig. 3 illustrates the case where it falls with z.24
At z = e z, there is a discrete drop in the demand for unskilled labour and a corresponding jump in demand
for skilled labour, as sectors begin to invest in capacity: output is continuous in z, so investment in capacity
in eﬀect substitutes skilled for unskilled labour. As z increases further, demand for both factors falls, not
because actual costs incurred rise, but because the penalty for producing beyond capacity rises and so higher
prices can be sustained. Finally, beyond zC, factor demands do not change further as γ (z)i sa s s u m e dt ob e
independent of z in the ﬁgure.
4.3 Free-Trade Equilibrium
Despite the added complexities of the duopoly case, the analysis of the monopoly case continues to apply
in qualitative terms. In particular, the equilibrium conditions can still be reduced to two equations in the
unskilled wage w and the extensive margin e z, and the qualitative properties of Fig. 1 are unchanged.25
The skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus continues to be unambiguously downward-sloping, as a higher
extensive margin leads to excess supply of skilled labour, requiring a fall in the unskilled wage to restore
equilibrium. In addition, the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus continues to be ambiguous in slope
except that it must be upward-sloping in the neighborhood of e z = 1: a higher extensive margin must lead
to excess demand for unskilled labour when the extensive-margin eﬀect dominates, but may lead to excess
supply if the intensive-margin eﬀect is important. (Equation (33) in the Appendix shows that the eﬀects
under duopoly are formally identical to those in the monopoly case as given by equation (15) above.)
5 Comparative Statics
We can now consider the eﬀects of shocks to an initial equilibrium. We concentrate on symmetric shocks
to both countries, to preserve our “North-North” focus. The ﬁrst shock we consider is a change in factor
24The responsiveness of l(z)t oa ni n c r e a s ei nz in pure Bertrand sectors equals η0(z)qB {c(z)}[1 − ε(z)]. Here η(z) ≡
θ(z)+γ (z)a n ds oη0(z) may be either positive or negative in general, though it is positive under the special assumptions made
in Fig. 3; c(z)e q u a l swη(z) in this range; and ε(z) ≡− [c(z)/qB {c(z)}][∂qB {c(z)}/∂c(z)] is the elasticity of output with
respect to marginal cost, which can be greater or less than one. Hence the case illustrated in Fig. 3 corresponds to a relatively
high cost elasticity of output.
25Technically, this arises because, as a marginal sector switches from quasi-Bertrand to Cournot behaviour, its output, and
hence its factor demands, do not change. Hence the labour-market equilibrium conditions, (20) and (21), are independent of
the new variable zC, and so the Jacobian of the coeﬃcient matrix is block-triangular: the equilibrium values of ˜ z, w and r
are determined by (4), (20) and (21), just as they were determined by (4), (11) and (13) in autarky, while equation (17) alone
determines the equilibrium value of zC.
13endowments, both absolute and relative. Then we turn to consider skill-biased technological progress, also
in both absolute and relative forms.
Consider ﬁrst an increase in the overall size of each economy as measured by the labour force ¯ L,w h i c h
implies a uniform increase in the endowment of both skilled and unskilled labour. Inspection of the labour-
market equilibrium conditions, (11) and (13), and the expression for output, (12), shows that this type of
growth is completely neutral. Demands for all goods, and hence outputs by all ﬁrms, rise in line with growth,
and so no change in the initial factor prices and threshold sectors is required. This occurs despite the fact
that demands are not homothetic.26 It arises because, with investment in capacity chosen endogenously,
there are no exogenous ﬁxed costs in the economy: all costs are proportional to output. It is true that
capacity costs are incurred before output is produced, so it is appropriate to call them ﬁxed costs, but their
level is endogenous rather than exogenous. By contrast, in traditional models of monopolistic competition
with exogenous ﬁxed costs, such as Krugman (1979), growth per se leads to an increase in productivity
and ﬁrm size (and/or ﬁrm numbers if entry is possible). For medium- and long-run analysis it seems more
plausible to assume that ﬁxed costs arise from prior investments rather than from fundamental properties
of the technology. For completeness, we summarize this result as follows:
Proposition 1 An increase in the number of households ¯ L, which implies an equal proportionate increase
in the endowments of skilled and unskilled labour, leads to an equal proportionate increase in the outputs of
all sectors, and no change in factor prices or in the threshold sectors ˜ z and zC.
By contrast, a change in relative factor endowments is not neutral. To see this, consider the eﬀects of an
increase in s, the representative household’s endowment of skilled labour, and thus the economy-wide ratio
of skilled to unskilled labour. Inspecting the equilibrium loci, (11) and (13), and recalling that rδ = wθ(e z),
this shock leaves the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus unaﬀected while it shifts downwards the
skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus. As Fig. 4 shows, the eﬀect is to lower the extensive margin e z.A s
a result, the skill premium r/w deﬁnitely falls, although the unskilled wage itself may rise or fall. Fig. 4
illustrates the case where the unskilled wage rises because unskilled labour is a general-equilibrium substitute
for skilled labour in the relevant range: the increased endowment of skilled labour drives down its reward,
encouraging more unskilled labour usage in all capacity-using sectors, with the result that the unskilled
wage rises. By contrast, when unskilled labour is a general-equilibrium complement for skilled labour, so the
initial equilibrium is along the upward-sloping portion of the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus, the
unskilled wage falls.
How do these responses to a greater endowment of skilled labour aﬀe c tt h ed e g r e eo fc o m p e t i t i o ni nt h e
economy? Since e z falls, the number of “pure Bertrand” sectors deﬁnitely falls. The eﬀect on the threshold


















where the signs of the terms on the right-hand side are as indicated. The second pair of terms is unambigu-
ously negative: the rise in s reduces the threshold sector e z as we have seen, which tends to pull down zC.
However, the change in the unskilled wage is ambiguous as we have also seen: if the wage falls, the case where
unskilled labour is a general-equilibrium complement for skilled labour, this tends to raise zC.E v e ni nt h i s
case however, we can conclude that the economy has become less competitive: since both factor prices fall
relative to the num´ eraire, aggregate proﬁts must rise: ﬁrm owners gain both directly from the increase in the
endowment of skilled labour and indirectly from the resulting softening in demand for unskilled labour.27
26As discussed in Neary (2003a), even when e = 1, continuum-quadratic preferences as in (5) and (6) are not homothetic,
though they are a member of the Gorman polar form or quasi-homothetic family of preferences. The implied Engel curves are
straight lines, but do not pass through the origin.
27We are grateful to Jonathan Eaton for pointing out this implication of our results.
14Similar eﬀects follow when the relative endowment of skilled labour rises not because of an absolute
increase in its supply but because of skill upgradingo fs o m eo ft h ee x i s t i n gl a b o u rf o r c e . T h i sc a nb e
represented by compensating changes in the unskilled and skilled endowment parameters μ and s (with μ
initially equal to one), such that the aggregate endowment (μ + s) ¯ L remains constant. As in Fig. 4, an
increase in the skilled endowment s shifts the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus downwards; in addition,
the fall in the unskilled endowment μ shifts the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus upwards. Once
again, the extensive margin e z and the skill premium r/w deﬁnitely fall, but the unskilled wage may rise or
fall, with the latter outcome only possible when unskilled labour is a general-equilibrium complement for
skilled labour. Summarizing these results:
Proposition 2 An increase in the relative endowment of skilled labour, whether in absolute terms or through
skill upgrading of some unskilled workers, reduces the skill premium and the extensive margin e z.T h eu n s k i l l e d
wage rises if and only if unskilled labour is a general-equilibrium substitute for skilled labour. In either case,
the economy becomes less competitive in aggregate.
The ﬁnal shock we consider is skill-biased technological progress, corresponding in our model to an
exogenous fall in the skilled-labour requirements parameter δ.28 This aﬀects the diagram in {w, ˜ z} space in
the same way as an increase in the relative endowment of skilled workers in Proposition 2: the unskilled-
labour-market equilibrium locus is unaﬀected while the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus shifts to the
left. As a result, Fig. 4 still applies in qualitative terms. In particular, ˜ z deﬁnitely falls: more sectors adopt
skill-intensive techniques in response to an improvement in their productivity. Once again, therefore, the
economy becomes less competitive, because more sectors invest in capacity which allows them to sustain
higher prices. In addition, the unskilled wage may rise or fall as before, rising if and only if unskilled labour
is a general-equilibrium substitute for skilled labour. By contrast, the implications for the skill premium are
diﬀerent from the case of an endowment increase in Proposition 2. Totally diﬀerentiating the equilibrium
condition (4) gives:
dlnr − dlnw = Eθzdln ˜ z − dlnδ (23)
where Eθz ≡ z
θ
dθ
dz is the elasticity of the θ(z) schedule across sectors, here evaluated at ˜ z. The second
term on the right-hand side is the direct eﬀect of pure skill-biased technological progress, which tends to
raise the skill premium (since δ falls). However, this could be oﬀset by the ﬁrst term, since ˜ z also falls.
Intuitively, from (4) the skill premium r/w equals the marginal rate of technical substitution between skilled
and unskilled labour in the threshold sector ˜ z: the ratio of the unskilled labour saved by investing in one
extra unit of capacity θ(˜ z) to the skilled labour needed to construct that unit of capacity, δ. The direct eﬀect
of the fall in δ could be oﬀset by the indirect eﬀect of the expansion of sectors investing in capacity, if ˜ z falls
suﬃciently and/or if the fall in ˜ z reduces suﬃciently the penalty for producing above capacity θ(z). Either
of these eﬀects can dominate, so the change in the skill premium is ambiguous. Thus our model highlights
how general-equilibrium adjustments, working through changes in the extensive margin, can partially or
fully oﬀset the direct eﬀects of technological progress on the skill premium. In summary:
Proposition 3 Skill-biased technological progress in all sectors raises the skilled wage, has an ambiguous
eﬀect on the skill premium, and reduces the extensive margin e z, so the economy becomes less competitive in
aggregate.
28As Johnson (1997) notes, this type of technological progress, which he calls “intensive skill-biased”, corresponds to skilled
workers becoming more productive in jobs they already perform, for example as a result of the widespread adoption of personal
computers. (See also Card and DiNardo (2002).) Our model also allows us to consider technological progress that is “extensive
skill-biased”, represented by the combination of a fall in δ with an increase in the unskilled-labour requirements parameters
γ (z). Again, following Johnson (1997), this corresponds to skilled workers becoming more eﬃcient in jobs that were formerly
done by unskilled workers, for example as a result of the adoption of robotics in manufacturing. The eﬀects of the latter are
broadly similar to the case considered in the text, with the additional complication that the unskilled-labour equilibrium locus
also shifts.
156 Comparing Autarky and Free Trade
So far, we have looked only at shocks to either the autarky or free trade equilibria. In this section we turn to
compare them. Note ﬁrst the eﬀects of moving from autarky to free trade in sectors which do not invest in
capacity in autarky (i.e., sectors with z<˜ zA). On the one hand, those sectors’ demand for unskilled labour
at initial wages clearly increases as the market size expands. On the other hand, since these sectors do not
use skilled labour, there is no change in their demand for skilled labour at initial wages. This asymmetric
change in factor demands by itself tends to raise the unskilled wage as the economy moves from autarky
to free trade. A higher unskilled wage in turn encourages more sectors to invest in capacity, so both the
extensive margin and the skill premium fall. In a skill-scarce economy where most sectors do not invest in
capacity, so ˜ zA is close to one, this eﬀect dominates: so the primary impact of moving to free trade is to
lower the skill premium. This result is straightforward, but for completeness we state it formally:
Proposition 4 In a skill-scarce economy, where ˜ zA is close to one, a move from autarky to free trade leads
to an increase in the unskilled wage, and a decrease in both the extensive margin and the skill premium.
(The proof is immediate.)
Next, we show that the eﬀect highlighted in Proposition 4 also dominates in the special case where
variable costs are the same in all sectors, provided only that ˜ zA is strictly positive:
Proposition 5 When γ(z) is independent of z,a n d˜ zA is strictly positive, a move from autarky to free trade
leads to an increase in the unskilled wage, and a decrease in both the extensive margin and the skill premium.
The proof (in the Appendix) is complex but can be explained intuitively with the help of Fig. 5. With
increased competition, the demand for both factors rises in the move from monopoly to duopoly. Hence the
unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus shifts upwards and the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus
shifts rightwards as shown. To prove the proposition we need to show that the vertical shift in the L locus
is greater than that in the S locus. Let wS denote the new unskilled wage rate which is just suﬃcient to re-
establish equilibrium on the market for skilled labour without any change in the extensive margin ˜ z. Hence
point AS, with an unskilled wage equal to wS and a threshold sector equal to the monopoly level ˜ zA,l i e s
on the duopoly skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus, and we need to show that it lies below the duopoly
unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus. Because γ (z) is independent of z, the increase in w to wS exactly
oﬀsets the eﬀect of extra competition in raising demand for unskilled labour from the capacity-using sectors.
But the remaining sectors (those with z<˜ z) are unskilled-labour-intensive, both on average and at the
margin, precisely because they do not invest in capacity. Hence this increase in w is not suﬃcient to choke
oﬀ their extra demand for unskilled labour, and the unskilled wage must rise by more, to the level denoted
wF in the ﬁgure, to clear both markets. As a result, the new equilibrium is at AF, where the threshold
sector ˜ z and the skill premium are lower in free trade relative to autarky.
Consider next the case where variable costs are strictly decreasing in z. Now the factor intensity diﬀerences
across sectors work in the opposite direction to Proposition 5: the increased market size tends to encourage
disproportionately the expansion of sectors which invest in capacity in autarky, increasing the relative demand
for skilled labour, which in turn tends to raise the skill premium. This eﬀect is most likely to dominate in
a skill-abundant economy, where relatively few sectors use only unskilled labour in autarky; and in an
economy where ﬁrms face little competition, so their factor demands expand to take full advantage of the
larger market. It will deﬁnitely dominate, and so the skill premium will deﬁnitely increase, if both these
properties hold: ˜ zA is zero, so no sectors use only unskilled labour in autarky, and e equals zero, so ﬁrms do
not compete head-to-head. Summarizing:
Proposition 6 When γ(z) is strictly decreasing in z, ˜ zA is zero, and e equals zero, then a move from
autarky to free trade increases both the extensive margin and the skill premium.
16Formally, the proof proceeds in a similar way to that of Proposition 5, except that now there is excess supply
of unskilled labour at the autarky threshold sector (˜ zA = 0) and at the wage wS just suﬃcient to choke oﬀ
excess demand for skilled labour.
The results of Propositions 5 and 6 are summarized in Fig. 6. Here we specialize to the case where the
distributions of technology parameters are linear, so γ (z)=γ0 − γ1z and θ(z)=θ0 + θ1z.T h e v e r t i c a l
axis plots γ1, which is a measure of intersectoral diﬀerences in factor intensity (speciﬁcally, in the unskilled
labour requirement per unit output). The horizontal axis plots e, which as already mentioned can be viewed
as a measure of the intensity of competition within sectors. We have seen from Proposition 5 that, when all
sectors have the same unskilled labour requirements (so γ1 is zero), free trade leads capacity—using sectors
to raise their demands for both factors in equal proportions. Provided there ares o m es e c t o r si na u t a r k y
which do not use capacity, their increased relative demand for unskilled labour therefore dominates the move
from autarky to free trade and induces a fall in the skill premium. Hence Proposition 5 tells us that, at
points along the horizontal axis in Fig. 6, free trade leads to a lower skill premium. As for Proposition 6,
it considers the case where e is zero, so the move from autarky to free trade does not expose ﬁrms to extra
competition but only has a market size eﬀect, which encourages a large increase in output by all ﬁrms. When
all sectors use skilled labour in autarky and γ1 is strictly positive, this eﬀect encourages a larger relative
increase in the demand for skilled labour. Hence, Proposition 6 tells us that at points along the vertical axis
free trade leads to a higher skill premium.
The locus in the interior of Fig. 6, based on simulations for the linear case, shows combinations of γ1 and
e which yield no change in the skill premium and the extensive margin between autarky and free trade.29
Thus a rise in the skill premium and the extensive margin is encouraged by greater diﬀerences in factor
intensity between sectors, and by less intense competition within sectors.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented a new model which integrates some key features of industrial organization and
general-equilibrium trade theory, and highlights a new mechanism whereby relative wages and the nature
of competition within sectors are aﬀected by exogenous shocks. The model extends to general equilibrium
the work of Maggi (1996), building on Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), which predicts that ﬁrms will exhibit
Bertrand or Cournot behaviour depending on the costs of investing in capacity, where capacity serves as a
commitment device to sustain higher prices. Maggi looked at normative questions only. In particular, he
showed that the Kreps-Scheinkman approach resolves the apparent conﬂict between Brander and Spencer
(1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), who proved respectively that the optimal export subsidy is positive
in Cournot competition and negative in Bertrand competition.30 Here we have focused instead on positive
questions, including the eﬀects of exogenous shocks such as changes in relative factor endowments and trade
liberalization on the distribution of income and on the margin between more and less competitive sectors.
Of course, trade liberalization leads directly to more competition when the number of ﬁrms in each
sector rises. However, just how much more competition is induced depends on whether ﬁrms are able to
sustain prices above the Bertrand level. Our model shows that this in turn depends both on technology
and on factor prices, with the latter determined endogenously in general equilibrium. When sectors diﬀer
in their requirements of unskilled labour, and when goods are more diﬀerentiated within sectors so inter-
ﬁrm competition is less intense, trade between similar economies raises the relative return to skilled labour,
making it more diﬃcult to sustain higher prices through investment in capacity and so leading to greater
competition throughout the economy. By contrast, when sectors have relatively similar unskilled-labour
29The parameter values underlying the simulation are: s=0.99; b=10; γ0=1; θ0=0; θ1=1; a=100; L=45. A Mathematica
program giving the calculations is available on our web pages.
30An obvious extension of the present paper would be to consider optimal trade and industrial policy. This would qualify
Maggi’s results by adding general-equilibrium eﬀects similar to those considered by Dixit and Grossman (1986).
17requirements, and when competition between ﬁrms is relatively intense, opening up to trade lowers the skill
premium thereby reducing the cost of investing in capacity and sustaining higher prices.
The model also exhibits other novel features. It shows that the eﬀects of exogenous shocks to factor
endowments and technology diﬀer greatly depending on the relative importance of changes at the intensive
or extensive margin in their eﬀects on the demand for unskilled labour. And, although preferences are non-
homothetic and ﬁxed costs play an important role, the fact that the ﬁxed costs are endogenous implies that
the economy exhibits constant returns to scale in the aggregate, in striking contrast to standard trade models
with exogenous ﬁxed costs. More work is needed to explore the robustness of these and other properties of
the model to alternative speciﬁcations of the workings of factor markets and the ways in which technology
and factor prices interact to aﬀe c tt h en a t u r eo fc o m p e t i t i o nb e t w e e nﬁrms.
188A p p e n d i x
8.1 Derivation of the Marginal Utility of Income
An individual’s marginal utility of income with continuum quadratic preferences and homogeneous products
in each sector is derived in Neary (2003a). With diﬀerentiated products, the steps are similar. First invert
the individual inverse demand functions (8) to get the direct demand functions:
xi(z)=α − λβ[pi(z) − epj(z)] i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j (24)








Now multiply the direct demand functions for goods i and j in sector z by pi(z)a n dpj(z) respectively, add
to get the individual’s expenditure on both goods in that sector, and integrate over all sectors to get her total
expenditure. Substituting for I and solving gives the explicit expression for λ in (9), where the moments of

















When prices are the same in all sectors, νp reduces to μ
p
2. Note, however, that we cannot take the limit of
(9) as e approaches 1, since the inverse demand functions cannot be inverted in this case. The value of λ
when e equals 1 can instead be calculated directly by integrating over the inverse demand functions times
the corresponding prices as in Neary (2003a).
8.2 Properties of the Equilibrium Loci
Consider ﬁrst the monopoly or autarky equilibrium of Sections 2 and 3. Write the equilibrium condition for
the skilled-labour-market, equation (13), as s¯ L = SA(w,r,e z), with r determined by (4). The derivative of
















{γ (z)+θ(e z)}dz < 0 (27)
which is negative since
∂qA
∂c = − 1


















0 (e z)dz < 0 (28)
Similarly, the equilibrium condition for the unskilled-labour-market, equation (11), can be written as ¯ L =




















γ (z){γ (z)+θ(e z)}dz
#
< 0 (29)
However, the derivative of the demand for unskilled labour with respect to the extensive margin e z is am-
biguous in sign, as discussed in the text.
19Consider next the duopoly or free-trade case of Sections 4 and 5. As before, write the equilibrium
condition for the skilled-labour market, equation (21), as s¯ L = SF(w,r,e z), with r determined by (4). The






































0 (e z)dz < 0 (31)
Similarly, the equilibrium condition for the unskilled-labour market, equation (21), can be written as ¯ L =












































γ (z)dz ≷ 0 (33)
Crucially, the latter derivative is ambiguous in sign, for similar reasons to the corresponding derivative in
the monopoly case, (15), as discussed in the text.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the Lemma by contradiction. Suppose that zC is less than or equal to ˜ z: zC ≤ ˜ z. It then follows
that:




+ θ(zC)} ≤ w{γ
¡
zC¢





[from (3) and (4)] (36)
⇒ pC[cN ¡
zC¢
] ≤ pC[cK ¡
zC¢
][ s i n c e pC is increasing in c from (16)] (37)
⇒ pB[cN ¡
zC¢
] <p C[cK ¡
zC¢
] (38)
The last inequality follows from the fact that, by direct calculation from (16), the Cournot equilibrium price
strictly exceeds the Bertrand equilibrium price for all c, provided e is strictly positive:
pC(c) − pB(c)=
e2(ˆ a − c)
4 − e2 (39)
Since the inequality in (38) is strict, this contradicts the deﬁnition of zC given by (17). Hence it is not
possible to have zC ≤ ˜ z, which proves the Lemma.
208.4 Proof of Lemma 2
To prove the lemma, deﬁne the following function:
∆(z,w,r) ≡ pC[cK (z;w,r)] − pB[cN (z;w)] (40)
w h e r ew eh a v em a d ee x p l i c i tt h ed e p e n d e n c eo ft h ec o s tt e r m so nf a c t o rp r i c e s .T h ef u n c t i o n∆ equals the
diﬀerence between the Cournot and Bertrand prices evaluated at an arbitrary z. From equation (17), which



























δ > 0 (43)
Evaluating these terms at z = zC implies that zC is decreasing in w and increasing in r if and only if H(zC)
is positive, which proves the Lemma.
To prove the corollary, we deﬁne a new function ∆G whose arguments are (z,w,˜ z)r a t h e rt h a n( z,w,r),
i.e., with rδ replaced by wθ(˜ z):
∆G(z,w,˜ z)=pC[cK (z;w,˜ z)] − pB[cN (z;w)] (44)
The derivative of this with respect to z i st h es a m ea sb e f o r e ,∆G
z = ∆z, which is negative if and only if
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0 (˜ z) > 0 (46)
The former is negative at z = zC > ˜ z (recalling Lemma 1). Hence, we have proved the corollary: in general
equilibrium, zC is decreasing in w at given ˜ z and increasing in ˜ z at given w, if and only if H(zC) is positive.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Denote the equilibrium wage and extensive margin in the autarky equilibrium by wA and ˜ zA respectively.
In the autarky equilibrium where we assume that γ(z) is independent of z,s oγ(z)=γ0 for all z,t h e







}]dz = SA ¡
wA, ˜ zA¢
(47)
Now, consider the move to free trade. Hold the extensive margin ﬁxed at the autarky equilibrium level ˜ zA,
and assume that the unskilled wage needed to restore equilibrium on the skilled labour market is given by










}]dz = SF ¡
wS, ˜ zA¢
(48)
21Since the increase in market size raises the demand for skilled labour in every sector, we have that wS >w A.
Consider next the market for unskilled workers. In the autarky case, the equilibrium condition for this











Using the equilibrium condition in the market for skilled workers from equation (47), the second integral can










{γ0 + θ(z)}qA[wA{γ0 + θ(z)}]dz = LA1 ¡
wA, ˜ zA¢
(50)
where LA1 (.) denotes the autarky demand for unskilled workers from those sectors which do not invest in
capacity. (Note that δ >s γ0 is necessary for an interior equilibrium with ˜ zA > 0.) Similarly, in free trade,
the demand for unskilled workers from the non-capacity-using sectors only, evaluated at wS and ˜ zA,i s :
Z ˜ zA
0
{γ0 + θ(z)}qB[wS{γ0 + θ(z)}]dz = LF1 ¡
wS, ˜ zA¢
(51)
where LF1 (.) denotes the free trade demand for unskilled workers from those sectors which do not invest in




is positive, so there
is excess demand for unskilled labour at wS and ˜ zA. When this is the case, the move from autarky to free
trade will lead to an unskilled wage greater than wS and a threshold sector ˜ z lower than ˜ zA,a si nF i g .5 .











wS {γ0 + θ(z)}
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− qA[wA{γ0 + θ(z)}]
®
dz (52)




qB[wS{γ0 + θ(z)}] >q A[wA{γ0 + θ(z)}] (53)
Substituting from the expressions for output in (19) and (12), this is equivalent to:
Ω(z) ≡
ˆ a − wA{γ0 + θ(z)}





where η ≡ (2 − e)(1 + e).












ˆ a − wA{γ0 + θ(z)}
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[ˆ a − wS{γ0 + θ(z)}]
2 > 0 (55)
since θ
0 (z) > 0a n dwS >w A.
22Deﬁne a new function which gives the demand for skilled labour in the hypothetical situation where the
equilibrium in all capacity-using sectors is as if ﬁrms behave in a Bertrand manner facing the true production
cost w(γ0 + rδ)=w{γ0 + θ(˜ z)}:
SF 0
(w, ˜ z) ≡
Z 1
˜ z
qB[w{γ0 + θ(˜ z)}]dz
Now deﬁne a new unskilled wage w0 as the solution to s¯ L = SF 0 ¡
w0, ˜ zA¢
. SF 0
(w, ˜ z)o v e r e s t i m a t e st h e
demand for skilled workers relative to SF (w, ˜ z) for all values of w and ˜ z, since it assumes a lower production
cost in those sectors for which ˜ z<z<z C and a Bertrand rather than a Cournot outcome in those sectors





= SF 0 ¡
w0, ˜ zA¢
(56)
since both are equal to s¯ L by construction. Substituting once again from the expressions for output in (19)
and (12), this implies:






















This, together with (55), means that (54) holds for all z ∈
£
0, ˜ zA¤
, which proves the proposition.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of Proposition 6 proceeds in the same way as that of Proposition 5, with two key diﬀerences. First,
we wish to show that there is excess supply of (not excess demand for) unskilled labour at wS and ˜ zA =0 .
Second, the additional assumption that e = 0 implies from (19) and (12) that qB (c)=qC (c)=2 qA (c)
(recalling that ˆ b in free trade is twice the autarky level); and that zC =˜ z. With these assumptions equation







}]dz = SF ¡
wS, ˜ zA¢
(58)
Equating this to the autarky skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus, equation (13), yields
R 1
˜ zA Q(z)dz =0 ,
where:
Q(z) ≡ 2δqA[wS{γ (z)+θ
¡
˜ zA¢











γ0 > 0 (60)
Next, consider the unskilled labour market. The equilibrium locus in autarky is given by (11). In free










23This holds when ˜ zA = 0 but not when ˜ zA > 0, since in that case sectors with z<˜ zA also demand unskilled
workers. Hence the excess demand for unskilled labour at wS and ˜ zA =0e q u a l s :
LF ¡
wS, ˜ zA¢




Since γ0 (z) < 0a n dQ0 > 0, we can invoke the Chebyshev Integral Inequality and conclude that the right-
hand-side integral is negative, which proves the proposition.31
31We thank Banu Demir for pointing out that the Chebyshev Integral Inequality considerably simpliﬁes this proof.
249 Supplementary Appendix
We want to explore further the shapes of the two labour-market equilibrium loci, and to see what, if any,
additional restrictions can be imposed on the monopoly equilibrium when we assume that the factor require-
ments are linear in z: γ (z)=γ0 −γ1z and θ(z)=θ0 +θ1z. We assume that all four parameters, γ0, γ1, θ0
and θ1, are non-negative. In addition, since we require γ (z) > 0 for all z,w ea s s u m et h a tγ0 > γ1.
9.1 The Skilled-Labour-Market Equilibrium Locus
The properties of the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus (13) have already been derived in general, but
for completeness we derive an explicit expression for its slope. Even with general functional forms, (13) is
linear in the wage rate, and so we can solve it for wS, the wage which clears the skilled-labour market, as a





(1 − ˜ z)ˆ a − 2ˆ b
δ s¯ L
(1 − ˜ z)θ(˜ z)+
R 1
˜ z γ (z)dz
(63)
The denominator B (˜ z) is always positive for ˜ z<1, and so the numerator, though negative when ˜ z =1 ,
must be positive when ˜ z = 0 for an equilibrium with a positive wage to exist. Diﬀerentiating wS,t h es l o p e











A0 (˜ z)=−ˆ a<0 B0 (˜ z)=( 1− ˜ z)θ
0 (˜ z) − {γ (˜ z)+θ(˜ z)} ≷ 0 (65)











9.2 The Unskilled-Labour-Market Equilibrium Locus
Consider next the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus (11). Once again, this can be solved for wL,
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9.3 The Second Derivative of the Unskilled-Labour-Market Equilibrium Locus
If it could be proved that the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus always has a negative second deriva-
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γ (z)dz ≷ 0
At a point where the locus changes sign, we have dwL
d˜ z =0 ,s od2wL
d˜ z2 = 1
E(˜ z) [C00 (˜ z) − w(˜ z)E00 (˜ z)]. Evaluating
the second derivative in the linear case yields:
d2wL
d˜ z2













ˆ a − wL {γ (˜ z)+θ(˜ z)}
¤
− wL [θ1 (θ0 + θ1˜ z) − θ1γ0 − θ0γ1]
E (˜ z)
The ﬁrst term in square brackets in the numerator of this expression is deﬁnitely positive, since it is pro-
portional to output in the threshold sector ˜ z, but the second may be negative. Hence the sign of the whole
expression is ambiguous.
9.4 Direct Comparison of the Loci Slopes
Next, we compare the slopes of the two loci at a common point. We would like to show that, at any
equilibrium, where wS = wL = w,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tdwL
d˜ z > dwS
d˜ z , implying that (for continuous








B (˜ z)E (˜ z)
[B (˜ z){C0 (˜ z) − wE0 (˜ z)} − E (˜ z){A0 (˜ z) − wB0 (˜ z)}] (72)
=
1
B (˜ z)E (˜ z)
∙
{B (˜ z)θ(˜ z)+E (˜ z)}hˆ a − w{γ (˜ z)+θ(˜ z)}i + wθ
0 (˜ z)
½





The ﬁrst term in square brackets, multiplying hˆ a − w{γ (˜ z)+θ(˜ z)}i, represents extensive-margin eﬀects
and is unambiguously positive. However, the second term could be negative because of the intensive margin
eﬀect −B (˜ z)
R 1
˜ z γ (z)dz. Writing out this term in full:
(1 − ˜ z)E (˜ z) − B (˜ z)
Z 1
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26In the linear case, we can calculate explicitly the terms in γ (z):



















=( 1− ˜ z)
∙
˜ zγ2
0 − (1 + ˜ z)γ0γ1 +
1
4
(3 + ˜ z)γ2
1
¸
This is still ambiguous in sign: it can be negative for low values of ˜ z a n dh i g hv a l u e so fγ1/γ0 (even with the
restriction that γ0 > γ1).
9.5 Conclusion
In practice, an extensive search failed to ﬁnd a set of primitive parameter values which implies multiple
equilibria. Nevertheless, as this Supplementary Appendix shows, we cannot rule them out deﬁnitively, even
in the linear case, though they are likely to occur for only a relatively small subset of the parameter space.
We have considered only the monopoly case here, but it is clear from the equations in the text that similar
considerations apply to the duopoly case.
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